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Abstract
We analyse bank runs under fundamental and asset liquidity risk, adopting a realistic descrip-
tion of bank default. We obtain an unique run equilibrium, even as fundamental risk becomes
arbitrarily small. When safe returns are securitized and pledged to repo debt, funding costs
are reduced but risk becomes concentrated on unsecured debt. We show the private choice
of repo debt leads to more frequent unsecured debt runs. Thus satisfying safety demand via
secured debt creates risk directly. Collateral ﬁre sales upon default may reduce its liquidity
and lead to higher haircuts, which further increase the frequency of runs.
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1 Introduction
During the recent US ﬁnancial boom, credit expansion was boosted by strong demand for
safe assets (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009). As savers were willing to pay a safety
premium, safe debt was cheap and thus a desirable source of funding (Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012). Banks and shadow banks responded by issuing safer liabilities, such
as more short term commercial paper, as well as debt secured on ﬁnancial collateral, known as
repo. Once credit and liquidity risk became apparent, intermediaries suﬀered massive outﬂows
of unsecured debt, which forced ﬁre sales of illiquid assets. In contrast, repo credit raised
haircuts but was mostly rolled over up to the eve of default (Gorton and Metrick, 2012;
Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov 2012). After Lehmann’s default, unsecured lenders suﬀered
heavy losses, while repo lenders were able to repossess and sell the pledged collateral. The
induced ﬁre sales played a critical role in propagating distress.
The experience of the crisis has led to sharper scrutiny of liquidity risk, such as the fund-
ing of illiquid securitized assets with short term debt and secured ﬁnancial credit.1 In this
paper we ask two questions. Is there a direct eﬀect of asset liquidity risk on runs, next to
fundamental risk? With hindsight, MBS prices fell way too low given real credit losses, as
mortgage assets proved too illiquid to be backed by unstable funding. Second, how does the
pledging of collateral to repo lenders aﬀects other funding sources? Secured funding proved
more stable than unsecured funding. While its role in triggering collateral sales in default is
now well recognized (Stein, 2012; Infante, 2013), its direct eﬀect on unsecured debt is not well
understood.
We study run equilibria within a global game setting (Morris and Shin, 2003; Goldstein
and Pauzner, 2005), introducing asset liquidity risk next to fundamental risk. To model asset
liquidity, we introduce a precise characterization of the process of bank default. Traditional
models assume all assets are sold immediately to satisfy withdrawals (Diamond and Dybvig,
1984). In reality, once a bank runs out of liquid assets it is forced to declare default, triggering
a mandatory stay on remaining lenders to allow orderly liquidation of illiquid assets.2 Recog-
nizing this feature leads to a novel analysis of run incentives. We show that asset liquidity risk
causes a run equilibrium to arise, even if fundamental risk is arbitrarily small. In other words,
in this setup almost all runs may be ineﬃcient. The eﬀect of more liquid assets on stability is
interesting. As it reduces the chance that the bank runs out of liquidity to repay withdrawals,
it favors rollover. However, there is also a relative payoﬀ eﬀect, as both the chance of full
repayment in a run as well as the expected repayment after rollover rise. When liquid assets
1Next to repo, secured ﬁnancial credit includes margins on derivative positions.
2Bankruptcy law was introduced to solve the free rider problem when all creditors grab assets in an unco-
ordinated fashion, destroying value in the process.
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are low, the relative payoﬀ eﬀect dominates, leading to more runs. This reﬂects the eﬀect of
mandatory stay in bankruptcy, since illiquid assets are not paid out preferentially to those
who withdraw early. At some point recovery in bankruptcy becomes very high (the equivalent
of better fundamentals), so the probability eﬀect becomes predominant and the frequency of
runs decreases . This produces a concave, inverted U-shaped relation between asset liquidity
and run frequency. While the bank may reduce instability by oﬀering a high rollover premium,
in general it will not choose to leave rents to depositors. Next we introduce secured debt as
a funding choice. Once enough liquid assets are securitized and pledged, repo is safe even in
default, so it is always rolled over. In the absence of strategic complementarity, insuring risk
intolerant lenders is eﬃcient as it reduces funding costs. However, now unsecured debt bears
more risk, requiring a higher promised yield. Our contribution is to show that concentrating
asset liquidity risk on unsecured debt increases the change of costly runs, unless compensated
by a much higher yield. A social planner will reduce the frequency of inessential runs by leaving
maximum rollover rents to unsecured creditors. In contrast, a private intermediary will tend
to minimize funding costs, while choosing the maximum volume of secured debt. As a result,
the private choice of repo debt results in more ineﬃcient runs and default risk than the social
optimum. Granting greater security to some lenders is temptingly cheap, but makes other
lenders more insecure. 3
This direct risk eﬀect adds to the known externality associated with repo’s ﬁre sales of
seized collateral upon default .4 In our setup there is no externality eﬀect on the private choice
of secured funding, which is already at its maximum. However, a higher run frequency that
reduces collateral liquidity will induce higher haircuts. We show that this further concentrates
risk on unsecured debt, again increasing the frequency of runs.
In conclusion, unregulated secured funding adds risk by causing more runs and costly
liquidation, a loss to be traded oﬀ against its lower cost. The increased instability creates
larger deposit insurance losses, because of repossession of safe assets as well as a higher run
frequency.
An implication is that regulatory policy should monitor and constrain the scale of secured
funding, in order to reduce instability. On the other hand, a complete welfare assessment of
secured debt should take into account its role in satisfying a strong demand for safety. We
sidestep this issue by assuming that agents have a safe storage option, but the issue becomes
salient in a situation of excess demand for safety. Attracting very risk averse agents at a
low cost may increase the scale of investment, both by increasing the scale of funding and
3Repo debt represents a reduction in liquid collateral available to withdrawers, so its eﬀect on runs is also
nonmonotonic.
4On the ﬁnancial and legal incentives to quickly resell seized collateral, see Perotti (2011) and Duﬃe and
Skeel (2012)}.
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reducing the marginal required rate of return. The model has clear limitations as it does not
seek to endogenize all features of the intermediary. As most contributions in this literature,
we take demandable debt as given. The existence of mandatory liquid reserves is assumed, a
most realistic assumption for a bank. These features suggest some unmodeled causes, such as
liquidity needs. Introducing a contingent liquidity demand would considerably complicate the
analysis while not signiﬁcantly altering our results.
Related literature
The model analyses asset liquidity risk in the context of bank run models based on Gold-
stein and Pavner (2005). In their unique equilibrium, run incentives reﬂect some chance of
fundamental risk. Yet many runs are ineﬃcient, as a result of strategic complementarity (Di-
amond and Dybvig, 1983). We extend this result to the case of risk of large losses in case of
early liquidation of bank assets. While some amount of fundamental risk is essential for our
result, as it vanishes there remains a positive frequency of ineﬃcient runs. Intuitively, adding
interim asset liquidity risk increases the chance that depositors coordinate on a run.
The notion of asset liquidity risk here implies a distinct risk factor, weakly correlated with
fundamental risk. The natural interpretation are shocks to adverse selection or to the liquidity
available to market participants that are weakly related to the credit risk of bank assets.
The literature explains repo funding in terms of a strong demand for absolute safety, an
insight at the heart of recent work on instability and safety demand (Gennaioli et al., 2013;
Gorton and Ordon˜ez, 2014; Caballero and Fahri, 2013; Ahnert and Perotti, 2014.)
Existing work on repo credit (Martin et al 2012, Oehmke, 2014) study the dynamics of repo
runs, but does not compare it with debt of the same maturity, so there is no direct interaction
eﬀect. These models study the eﬀect of collateral liquidity, while we focus on the rapid sale
value of illiquid bank assets. He and Xiong (2011) provide a dynamic model of runs when
debt is staggered, where creditors’ roll-over decision depends on beliefs about other creditors’
subsequent roll-over choice. Kuong (2013) considers the case when unsecured debt responds
to higher repo margins by demanding higher required return, and shows that the resulting
higher leverage directly aﬀects risk taking by borrowers. Auh and Sundaresan (2014) looks
at the eﬀect of repo illiquidity risk on long term debt. In our set up, repo emerges as the
preferred choice by investors seeking absolute safety. Our results do not depend on secured
debt being demandable, as it is designed to be absolutely safe even in a run. Martin, Skeie
and von Thadden (2013) propose that secured credit arise when asset values are non veriﬁable.
Auh and Sundaresan (2014) argue that repo funding demands collateral to avoids violations
of absolute priority.5 They show that a bank may issue repo loans to save on the cost of long
5It may be ex post eﬃcient to violate absolute priority, e.g. to ensure proper continuation incentives.
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term debt, but will not issue too much when collateral liquidity is low.
Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) elaborate on the insight that information-insensitive claims
arise to overcome adverse selection (Pennacchi and Gorton, 1999). Runs triggered by collateral
illiquidity may be triggered when it become information sensitive.
A key driver is that investors seeking absolute safety are willing to pay a safety premium.
Such a strong investor preferences for safety has now been documented extensively (Gorton
Lewellen Metrick (2012), Krishnamurthy Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)), and is leading to a new
view of risk attitudes. Recent models also assume that a subset of agents act as (locally)
inﬁnitely risk averse (Caballero Fahri (2013), Gennaioli et al (2013)). 6
Our direct eﬀect of secured credit on stability complements the risk externality resulting
from the special bankruptcy treatment for collateralized ﬁnancial credit. The “safe harbor”
status creates a proprietary right directly enforceable on assets, and avoids risks such as exces-
sive issuance or imperfect enforcement that may dilute a claim value. The ability of secured
ﬁnancial creditors to gain immediate access to the collateral is a unique privilege, as it exempts
them from mandatory stay.
Legal scholars question whether it is justiﬁed to grant superior bankruptcy privileges to
repo and derivatives (e.g. Morrison, Roe and Sontchi 2015). Bolton and Oehmke (2011) shows
it leads to risk shifting incentives with derivatives. Duﬃe and Skeel (2012) argue that only
cash-like collateral should be excluded from automatic stay, in order to reduce the risk of ﬁre
sales. 7 Limiting asset eligibility for safe harbor would limit the scale of encumbered assets
and thus their direct eﬀect on instability.
Hanson, Stein, Shleifer and Vishny (2014) show how traditional banks are best at funding
less risky but less liquid projects, while shadow banks promise liquidity by pledging liquid
assets. In practice the distinction is not sharp, as repo funding issued by commercial banks
can be quite signiﬁcant, also because of central bank reﬁnancing. The degree of balance sheet
encumbrance is thus a key stability question for banking supervisors.
2 The Basic Model
The economy lasts for three periods t = 0, 1, 2. It is populated by a bank and a continuum of
lenders indexed by i. The intermediary has access to a project that needs one unit of funding
in t = 0. It raises funds from risk neutral lenders, each of whom is endowed with one unit.
Lenders demand a minimum expected return of γ > 1, reﬂecting their alternative option. The
6Alternatively, all agents may have Stone-Geary preferences demanding a subsistence level of wealth (Ahnert
and Perotti (2014)), thus being risk intolerant in some circumstances.
7This is equivalent to a “narrow shadow banking model”, also invoked in Gorton and Metrick (2012).
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Figure 1: Project Timeline
total mass of lenders is large such that perfect competition prevails.
• Project
For each unit invested, the project generates a return of yt (ω) in t = 1, 2, where ω ∈ {H,L}
is the aggregate state. With probability λ the state is revealed at t = 1 to be high (ω = H),
and the project matures in t = 1: y1 (H) = r > γ. With probability 1−λ, the state is revealed
to be low (ω = L), and the project matures only in t = 2. In this case, early liquidation at
t = 1 could be costly as the project has not fully developed its potential. The early liquidation
value has a safe component k > 0 plus an uncertain value θ, drawn from a uniform distribution
on
[
0, θ
]
. Liquidating risky assets at t = 1 involves a ﬁxed cost c.
All agents receive private signals on asset liquidity θ at the begin of time 1. In the low
state there is some fundamental risk at time 2. Asset returns are the same as in the high state
( y2 (L) = r) as long as θ ≥ c > 0. When asset liquidity is very low, θ < c, the ﬁnal return is
only y2 (L) = ρ < 1. As long as c is small, the project is almost riskless if allowed to mature.
Note that fundamental risk vanishes as c goes to zero.
The safe portion of the return may be securitized as liquid collateral and held as reserve.8 If
sold at time 1, ﬁnancial collateral returns an ex ante known price p ∈ (0, 1], where the discount
reﬂects limited interim liquidity. In the basic model we set p = 1, interpreting safe collateral
as cash reserves. The more general case is treated in the repo extension, where the price of
8The next section considers pledging collateral to lenders seeking higher safety.
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collateral at t = 1 is critical. To ensure that depositors can be fully repaid in the low state for
a suﬃciently high liquidation value, we assume that θ + k > 1 + c. This assumption and the
dependence of y2 (L) on θ create an upper and a lower dominance region in our global game
setup, needed to ensure equilibrium uniqueness.
The bank raises funds by issuing unsecured debt with face value d to a subset of mass one
of lenders.
• Lenders’ Information Structure
All agents observe the state ω at the begin of t = 1. In the high state the project has
matured, so all claims are safe. In the event of a low state ω = L, agents receive individual
noisy signals on the early liquidation value of assets in excess of the safe component θ.
This signal is given by
xi = θ + σηi, (1)
where σ > 0 is an arbitrarily small scale parameter and ηi are i.i.d. across players and uniformly
distributed over
[−1
2
, 1
2
]
.
• Bank Default and Orderly Liquidation
Since all claims are safe in the high state, we focus on the low state ω = L. Upon receiving
their signal, lenders may choose to withdraw the principal amount 1. The bank uses its reserves
sequentially to meet withdrawals. While the ﬁrst in the queue are ensured full repayment of
principal, once liquid reserves are exhausted the bank is forced to ﬁre sales of illiquid assets.
If remaining withdrawals are larger than the net liquidation proceeds, the bank is declared
in default. At that point bankruptcy law forces a stay for all unsecured creditors, avoiding
the cost c as well as ﬁre sales, and enabling orderly resolution at t = 2. This diﬀer from
the standard assumption that withdrawals are met by selling all assets immediately, which is
clearly less eﬃcient in the case of highly illiquid assets.
Orderly liquidation produces a ﬁnal value equal to 	 ≥ 0. At that point, any unpaid
depositors are treated equally. This implies a payoﬀ to lenders who rolled over even in case of
bank default, as it is the case in reality.
We assume that the project has positive NPV even if always liquidated unker orderly
resolution in the low state: λr + (1− λ) (k + 	) − γ > 0. To ensure equilibrium uniqueness,
we also assume that r − 1 ≤ 1− 	− k. This has two natural interpretations. First, the value
produced under orderly liquidation is insuﬃcient to fully repay all lenders: 	+ k < 1. Second,
it implies that a higher asset return (higher r) is associated with higher risk (lower 	+ k).
The bankruptcy event can be formally characterized as follows. Let φ be the fraction of
lenders that roll over in t = 1. The ﬁrst depositors in the running queue are paid out of liquid
6
Figure 2: Economy Timeline
collateral. If there are depositors left in the queue, the bank is declared bankrupt if and only
if
1− φ > θ − c+ k.
Here the left hand term indicates the face value demanded by running depositors, and the
right hand side the amount available at t = 1, namely the net liquidation value of illiquid assets
plus the value of the retained collateral. In other words, the bank is bankrupt if after paying
out all reserves the net value of selling its non reserve assets exceeds the claims of unpaid
withdrawing depositors.
• Lenders’ Payoﬀs
When the state is high, lenders are always repaid d. In the low state, their payoﬀs depend
on whether they roll over or withdraw, and whether the bank survives a run.
In a run, the random order of arrival implies that running depositors are repaid out of the
liquid reserves with probability 1−φ
∗
1−φ , where φ
∗ is such that 1− φ∗ = k. That is, 1− φ∗ is the
fraction of lenders running such that all withdrawers receive full repayment out of reserves.
With probability 1 − 1−φ∗
1−φ , the remaining withdrawers receive

φ∗ , their share of illiquid asset
value under orderly liquidation. Note that they share this value with the creditors who did
not run.
So the expected payoﬀ of lenders who do not roll over in t = 1 is
7
πNU (φ, θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩1, if 1− φ ≤ q (θ − c) + k1−φ∗
1−φ +
(
1− 1−φ∗
1−φ
)

φ∗ , if 1− φ > q (θ − c) + k
,
where q is an indicator function that equals 1 if θ ≥ c and 0 if θ < c.
Those who roll over receive d if the bank does not default. In bankruptcy, they are entitled
to receive 
φ∗ out of the orderly liquidation value. That is,
πRU (φ, θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩qd+ (1− q) ρ, if 1− φ ≤ q (θ − c) + k
φ∗ , if 1− φ > q (θ − c) + k
.
3 Runs under Asset Liquidity Risk
When lenders receive their signal, they face a complex coordination problem. Their decision
to roll over depends on their beliefs about both θ (fundamental uncertainty) and the fraction
φ of lenders that rolls over (strategic uncertainty).
3.1 Equilibrium Runs
The bank is assessed to be bankrupt if and only if withdrawals (1− φ) are suﬃciently large:
1− φ > q (θ − c) + k = q (θ − c) + k, (2)
Let ΠRU (φ, θ) be the net payoﬀ of lenders who roll over relative to that of running. We have
ΠRU (φ, θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩qd+ (1− q) ρ− 1, if (1− φ) ≤ q (θ − c) + k− k
(1−φ)
(
1− 
1−k
)
, if (1− φ) > q (θ − c) + k
. (3)
Suppose lenders follow a monotone strategy with a cutoﬀ κ, rolling over if their signal is
above κ and withdraw otherwise. Lender i’s expectation about the fraction of lenders that roll
over conditional on θ is simply the probability that any lender observes a signal above κ, that
is, 1 − κ−θ
σ
. This proportion is less than z if θ ≤ κ − σ (1− z). Each lender i calculates this
probability using the estimated distribution of θ conditional on his signal xi.
We rely now on the well known result in the literature of global games that as σ → 0,
this probability equals z for xi = κ.
9 That is, the threshold type believes that the propor-
tion of lenders that roll over follows the uniform distribution on the unit interval. As signals
9See Morris and Shin (2003) for a comprehensive discussion of the global games literature.
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Figure 3: Run Cutoﬀ
(a) Rollover Reward (b) Collateral
become nearly precise, strategic uncertainty dominates over uncertainty about θ. The equi-
librium cutoﬀ can then be computed by the threshold type who must be indiﬀerent between
rolling over and withdrawing given his beliefs about φ. Formally, it is the unique θ∗ such that∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ
∗) dφ = 0.
This leads us to our ﬁrst main result.
Proposition 1 (Run Cutoﬀ) In the limit σ → 0, the unique equilibrium in t = 1 has lenders
following monotone strategies with threshold θ∗ given by
θ∗ = e
−W
(
d−1
k(1− 1−k)
)
+ c− k, (4)
where all lenders roll over if θ > θ∗ and do not roll over if θ < θ∗.10
Proposition 1 allows us to derive how the probability of bankruptcy relates to the bank’s
ﬁnancing policy and its collateral. Recall that a lower θ∗ is desirable, as it implies less frequent
runs.
Corollary 1 (Yield and Collateral Eﬀects on Stability) θ∗ has the following properties:
(i) It is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in the roll over premium d, and strictly concave
in collateral value k.
10W (·) is known as the Lambert W function and is the inverse function of y = xex for x ≥ −1.
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(ii) There exists a cutoﬀ k∗ ∈
(
0, 1−√	
)
such that it is strictly decreasing in k for k ≥ k∗
and is strictly increasing in k for k < k∗.
Corollary 1 can be more easily interpreted after rewriting (12):
θ∗ − c+ k︸ ︷︷ ︸
debt recovery ratio
= e
−W
rolling over net-beneﬁt-to-cost ratio︷ ︸︸ ︷(
d− 1
k
(
1− 
1−k
)
)
. (5)
From (13), the signal θ∗ makes the threshold lender type just indiﬀerent, balancing the
recovery ratio in a run against the rollover premium d − 1. More k has a stabilizing “proba-
bility” eﬀect, the likelihood that the bank has enough liquid assets to repay withdrawals. The
second term reﬂects a “relative payoﬀ” eﬀect, the net beneﬁts of rolling over when there is no
bankruptcy relative to the losses incurred in a run.
Corollary 1 (illustrated in Figure 2) oﬀer some insight on the comparative statics. The
eﬀect of the rollover premium d is intuitive. Increasing it improves the payoﬀ of rolling over
for a given chance of default, and unambiguously reduces the probability of runs. However,
promising a large rollover reward reduces the return to the bank in all solvent states.
An increase in ﬁnancial collateral k has a more complex eﬀect. It has an unambiguous linear
“probability” eﬀect, reducing the chance that the bank runs out of reserves in a run and thus
leading to a lower θ∗. There is also a “relative payoﬀ” eﬀect, as more safe collateral increases
the expected payoﬀ of both rollover and run strategies. The probability eﬀect is dominant
when safe collateral is abundant. As it declines, runs are increasingly frequent. However, as
runners only receive safe collateral, at some point the relative payoﬀ of withdrawal relative to
rollover drops rapidly, producing the hump shaped relationship.11. This eﬀect of asset liquidity
is quite distinct from fundamental value, which has a monotonic eﬀect on run frequency.
By construction, runs in our model are ineﬃcient if and only if: (i) the bank is not insolvent,
θ ≥ c, or (ii) the ﬁnal return, even if lower than r, still exceeds the value of assets under
bankruptcy, ρ > k+ 	. Proposition 1 tells us that runs occur with positilve probability even if
fundamental risk becomes arbitrarily small, in which case almost all runs are ineﬃcient. This
is formalized in Corollary 2:
Corollary 2 Almost all runs are ineﬃcient for c → 0, in which case the probability of runs is
bounded away from zero: θ∗ ≥ e
−W
(
d−1
k(1− 1−k)
)
− k > 0.
11Note that this eﬀect would be stronger if a higher proportion of safe return k implied lower proceeds l in
the orderly liquidation process
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3.2 The Pricing of Unsecured Debt
This section examines the bank’s initial funding choice d. Because the project has positive
NPV for any funding choice, we can focus on the stability tradeoﬀ, excluding other eﬀects of
its ﬁnancing structure.
The ex ante expected payoﬀ of lenders as a function of its face value d is
VU (d) = λd+ (1− λ)
[
θ − θ∗ (d)
θ
d+
θ∗ (d)
θ
(k + 	)
]
The bank’s expected payoﬀ can be written as the return of the project of a solvent bank r
net of ﬁnancing costs and the expected deadweight loss DW (d):
VB (d) = λ (r − d) + (1− λ)
(
θ − θ∗ (d)
θ
)
(r − d) (6)
= r − VU (d)−DW (d) ,
where DW (d) is the total payoﬀ lost in the event of bankruptcy, that is
DW (d) = (1− λ) θ
∗ (d)
θ
(r − k − 	) . (7)
3.2.1 Socially Optimal Pricing
As a benchmark, we characterize the optimal ﬁnancing contract chosen by a social planner.
The social planner chooses the face value d that maximizes the aggregate payoﬀ subject to the
participation constraint of the bank and its lenders:
max
d
r −DW (d) (8)
subject to
VB (d) ≥ 0, VU (d) ≥ γ.
In other words, the optimal ﬁnancing policy minimizes the chance of runs (a deadweight
loss) subject to agents’ participation constraints. Since −DW (d) is increasing in d, the social
planner would increase d as much as possible.
Increasing d above lenders’ breakeven level oﬀers lenders some rent to encourage rollover,
henceforth deﬁned as “rollover rent”. The maximum rollover rent is reached when bank’s
participation constraint is binding at d = r, as all asset value is promised to depositors rolling
over. Since the bank’s participation constraint binds, it follows that the lenders’ participation
11
constraint does not bind. Proposition 2 characterizes the socially optimal ﬁnancing policy.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Funding) The socially optimal ﬁnancing contract requires the bank
to oﬀer the maximum possible rollover rent (do = r).
Intuitively, the social planner care about minimizing losses due to early withdrawals, and
thus boosts the incentive to roll over by oﬀering the maximum possible roll over yield.
3.2.2 Private Pricing
The bank’s problem is to choose the rollover reward d that maximize its payoﬀ subject to the
participation constraint:
max
d
VB (d) (9)
subject to
VU (d) ≥ γ.
In making this choice, the bank trades oﬀ the cost of ﬁnancing d against the expected
deadweight loss from runs.
Proposition 3 (Private Ineﬃciency) The probability of bankruptcy under the socially op-
timal funding structure is always lower than under the private funding choice: θ∗ (do) < θ∗ (d∗).
While the social planner minimizes the probability of runs by choosing the maximum fea-
sible rollover value do = r, the private choice of d∗ is lower than the social optimum value,
leading to a higher threshold θ∗ (d∗) > θ∗ (do) and thus more frequent runs.
Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal private funding choice.
Proposition 4 (Private Pricing) The bank’s ﬁnancing policy is characterized as follows:
(i) The privately optimal choice of d∗ either holds lenders to their participation constraint,
or leads to a positive rollover rent characterized by −∂DW (d∗)
∂d
= ∂VU (d
∗)
∂d
[1− μ∗] , where
μ∗ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with lenders’ participation constraint.
(ii) There exists a cutoﬀ λ1 ∈ [0, 1) such that, if λ > λ1, the bank oﬀers no rollover rents to
its lenders.
The face value d balances lower funding costs against a higher deadweight loss. When λ is
suﬃciently high, runs are rare so the private choice of funding is a corner solution.
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4 Runs with Repo
We now introduce repo funding, secured with ﬁnancial collateral. Assume that next to risk-
neutral lenders there exists a set of inﬁnitely risk averse lenders, willing to lend if and only if
assured to be paid in full in all states. In exchange for absolute safety, these “repo lenders”
accept a lower return equal to 1, the rate that they could earn on safe storage. The measure
of each set of lenders is suﬃciently large, ensuring perfect competition and allowing the bank
to ﬁnance the project with only one type of lender.
We now interpret k as the safe portion of asset returns at t = 2, which can be collateralized
at t = 0. This produces safe collateral that may be pledged to repo lenders. Now the value of
collateral p at the interim date t = 1 becomes relevant. We assume its price in the low state is
p, so that the value of safe collateral k at t = 1 is pk. Realistically, we assume that a fraction
of collateral k − k > 0 must be retained by the bank (e.g. to meet routine withdrawals), so
the maximum amount that can be pledged is k.12
We denote by u and s the fraction of unsecured and secured debt issued by the bank,
such that u + s = 1. As mores reduces the amount of safe return available to other lenders,
unsecured creditors require a higher rollover value to compensate for larger losses in default.
As we will see, although secured debt can be made so safe that it never runs, it concentrates
risk on unsecured lenders, potentially triggering more runs.
4.1 Equilibrium Runs
As repo lenders seek absolute safety, they will demand a haircut h since at t = 1 ﬁnancial
collateral may have value p, known at t = 0.
As the payoﬀ of secured lenders at t = 1 in case of a run is πS = ph, to ensure full repayment
the minimum haircut h∗ demanded at t = 0 solves ph∗ = 1.
Under a pledge of sh∗ units of ﬁnancial collateral, secured lenders are completely safe as
long as sh∗ = sp−1 ≤ k, which implies a higher bound on total secured debt s ≤ pk. Under
this condition, repo lenders never wish to run at t = 1.
Consider now the unsecured lenders’ rollover decision. Adjusting payoﬀs from the previous
section, the bank is bankrupt if and only if withdrawals 1− φ are suﬃciently large:
(1− φ) u > q (θ − c) + p (k − sh∗) = q (θ − c) + pk − s, (10)
Let ΠRU (φ, θ) be the net payoﬀ of unsecured lenders who roll over relative to that of running.
12This minimum reserve requirement recalls the Liquidity Coverage Ratio norm under Basel III.
13
We have
ΠRU (φ, θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩qd+ (1− q) ρ− 1, if u (1− φ) ≤ q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)− pk−s
(1−φ)(1−s)
(
1− 
1−pk
)
, if u (1− φ) > q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)
. (11)
As in the previous section, we focus on strategic uncertainty as signals become nearly
precise. At the equilibrium cutoﬀ, the threshold type must be indiﬀerent between rolling
over and withdrawing given uniform beliefs about φ. That is, it is the unique θ∗ that solves∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ
∗) dφ = 0.
This leads us to Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (Run Cutoﬀ with Repo) In the limit σ → 0, the unique equilibrium in
t = 1 has unsecured lenders following monotone strategies with threshold θ∗ given by
θ∗ = (1− s) e
−W
(
d−1
pk−s
1−s (1− 1−pk)
)
+ c− (pk − s) , (12)
where all unsecured lenders roll over if θ > θ∗ and do not roll over if θ < θ∗.13
Proposition 5 allows us to derive the relation between the probability of bankruptcy and
secured credit:
Corollary 3 (Eﬀects of Repo on Stability) θ∗ has the following properties:
(i) It is strictly concave in s.
(ii) It is ﬁrst strictly increasing then strictly decreasing in s if the value of safe collateral
is high (pk ≥ 1/2). If the value of safe collateral is low (pk < 1/2), it is ﬁrst strictly
increasing then strictly decreasing in s if the rollover yield is high (d > d > 1), and
strictly decreasing if the rollover yield is low (d ≤ d).
These results can be more easily interpreted after rewriting (12):
θ∗ − c+ (pk − s)
1− s︸ ︷︷ ︸
unsecured debt recovery ratio
= e
−W
rolling over net-beneﬁt-to-cost ratio︷ ︸︸ ︷⎛
⎝ d− 1
pk−s
1−s
(
1− 
1−pk
)
⎞
⎠
. (13)
13W (·) is known as the Lambert W function and is the inverse function of y = xex for x ≥ −1.
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Figure 4: Yield and Repo Eﬀects on Stability
(a) High Collateral
(
pk ≥ 12
)
(b) Low Collateral
(
pk < 12
)
The eﬀect of secured debt s on θ∗ is concave, while the sign of its derivative is ambiguous.
More s has a direct eﬀect to reduce the recovery ratio of unsecured debt, making the bank
more likely to go bankrupt for any given fraction of funds withdrawn. But more secured debt
reduces the collateral available to withdrawers, decreasing the opportunity cost of rolling over.
For most parameter values this produces a hump shaped relationship, while it is declining
when both the rollover reward d and collateral value are low. This result is intuitive as more
secured debt represents a drop in available collateral, so it mirrors the nonmonotonic eﬀect of
k on run incentives in the previous section.
Ultimately, the eﬀect of s depends on the choice of the rollover premium d. Intuitively, a
higher rollover premium lowers and ﬂattens the run threshold curve in s, the same eﬀect it has
on the run curve in k (see previous section). The slope of the threshold curve in s at s = 0
depends on both k and d. When assets have low liquidity risk (k is large, so that pk ≥ 1
2
),
a small increase in secured debt above s = 0 leads to a higher risk of runs (as the probability
eﬀect dominates), so the threshold θ∗ is hump shaped. 14. Figure 3(a) shows such a case. The
probability of runs at ﬁrst rises in s, reﬂecting the dominance of the risk concentration eﬀect
when available collateral is declining. It is then decreasing when the payoﬀ eﬀect becomes
more prominent, as very little collateral is available to runners. As d is set higher, θ∗ (s, d)
shifts lower.
In contrast, when asset liquidation risk is high (that is, k is suﬃciently low) and the rollover
reward oﬀered to unsecured debt d is very low, the run threshold has a very high intercept
and is declining in repo debt. The reason is that repo debt subtracts liquidity, and discourages
14This is the specular eﬀect of increasing the amount of safe collateral k
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withdrawals as most of the value is in illiquid assets that are shared with non withdrawing
lenders. While maximizing s may be the preferred private choice, increasing d would be more
eﬀective. This case is illustrated in Figure 3(b).
4.2 The Funding Choice
We can now examine the bank’s funding choice (s, d). Because the project has positive NPV
for any funding choice, we can focus on the cost/stability tradeoﬀ.
The expected payoﬀ of unsecured lenders as a function of its face value d is
VU (s, d) = λd+ (1− λ)
[(
θ − θ∗ (s, d)
θ
)
d+
θ∗ (s, d)
θ
pk − s+ 	
1− s
]
(14)
The bank’s payoﬀ can be written as the return of the project of a solvent bank r net of
ﬁnancing costs, minus the expected deadweight loss DW (s, d):
VB (s, d) = λ [r − d (1− s)− s] + (1− λ)
(
θ − θ∗ (s, d)
θ
)
[r − d (1− s)− s] (15)
= r − s− (1− s)VU (s, d)−DW (s, d) ,
where DW (s, d) is the total payoﬀ lost in the event of bankruptcy, that is
DW (s, d) = (1− λ) θ
∗ (s, d)
θ
(r − pk − 	) . (16)
4.2.1 Socially Optimal Funding
The socially optimal ﬁnancing contract chooses a pair (s, d) that maximizes the aggregate
payoﬀ subject to the participation constraint of the bank and unsecured lenders:
max
s, d
r −DW (s, d) (17)
subject to
VB (s, d) ≥ 0, VU (s, d) ≥ γ, s ∈ [0, pk] .
This is equivalent to minimize the probability of bankruptcy θ∗ (s, d) — and thus the
deadweight loss of runs — subject to agents’ participation constraints. Since −θ∗ (s, d) is
increasing in d, the social planner would increase the rollover premium d as much as possible
for any s. As the bank’s participation constraint is binding at d = r−s
1−s , this is the maximum
face value that may be chosen.
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Figure 5: Socially Optimal Funding
(a) High Project Return (r > r) (b) Low Project Return (r ≤ r)
Since the bank breaks even at the social optimum and the positive has positive NPV, lenders
receive positive rollover rents (i.e., their participation constraints do not bind). Thus, the social
optimum is achieved by minimizing θ
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
subject to s ∈ [0, pk] . The social planner can
indirectly increase the rollover reward d = r−s
1−s by increasing the amount of secured debt s, as
this relaxes the bank’s participation constraint. However, this may come at the cost of directly
increasing the probability of bankruptcy. Proposition 6 below shows that the social planner
either issues no secured debt or the maximum amount possible, which results from the strict
quasi-concavity of θ
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
.
Proposition 6 (Optimal Funding with Repo) The socially optimal contract (so, do) sets
the rollover yield do such that the bank breaks even: do = r−s
o
1−so . The bank issues either only
unsecured debt (so, do) = (0, r), or the maximum possible amount of secured debt (so, do) =(
pk, r−pk
1−pk
)
. If the project return is high (r > r > 1), issuing secured debt is socially optimal if
and only if the reserve requirement is suﬃciently low (k > k∗ ∈ (0, k)). If the project return is
low (r ≤ r), issuing only unsecured debt is never socially optimal.
Note that the threshold curve θ
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
under the socially optimal choice of maximizing
the rollover premium is no longer concave, since now d is increasing in s. As before, its slope at
s = 0 depends on d and thus on the project return. Proposition 6 indicates that whenever the
project return is high (r > r > 1), a small increase in secured debt above s = 0 always leads
to a higher risk of runs. In this case (illustrated in Figure 5(a)), the threshold curve is ﬁrst
strictly increasing then decreasing. As a result, the social planner chooses to issue no secured
debt unless the reserve requirement is very low.
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The threshold θ
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
may also be downward sloping from s = 0 when the project return
is low (that is, r ≤ r), which limits the size of the rollover premium. In this case it is best to
maximize the use of repo, as subtracting liquid collateral from runners discourages withdrawals.
Figure 5(b) show such a case.
It is worth noting that the result of Proposition 6 does not imply that secured debt could
not add value if k ≤ k∗. If the project had positive NPV if and only if some secured debt is
used (r − γ < 0), then it could be ﬁnanced only if some secured debt is used. Speciﬁcally, if
λr + (1− λ) (pk + 	)− (1− pk) γ − pk > 0,
then the project can be ﬁnanced provided that the bank issues enough secured debt.
4.2.2 Private Funding Choice
The bank’s problem is to choose a funding structure (s, d) that maximize its payoﬀ subject to
the participation constraint:
max
s, d
VB (s, d) (18)
subject to
VU (s, d) ≥ γ, s ∈ [0, pk] .
In choosing its optimal funding structure, the bank faces a tradeoﬀ between the cost of
ﬁnancing and the expected deadweight loss. The cost of ﬁnancing is decreasing in the face
value of unsecured debt d. As the unsecured lenders’ required payoﬀ is greater than for
secured lenders, increasing the proportion of secured debt reduces the average cost of ﬁnancing.
However, lower d makes runs more likely, which increases the expected deadweight loss.
Proposition 7 (Private Ineﬃciency with Repo) The probability of bankruptcy under the
socially optimal funding structure is always lower than under the bank’s ﬁnancing policy:
θ∗ (so, do) < θ∗ (s∗, d∗).
In graphic terms, because the private choice of d is lower than for the social planner, it
produces an upward shift of the θ∗ (s∗, d) curve with a higher intercept at s = 0. The curve
also exhibit increasing concavity. In conclusions, the private choice of s∗ is either equal or
higher than the social optimum value. Even when it is equal, it is combined with a lower value
for d, as shareholders prefer to earn more in solvent states than reducing further the chance of
runs. This leads to a higher threshold θ∗ (s∗, d), and thus more frequent runs than the social
optimum.
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Proposition 8 characterizes the optimal private funding choice.
Proposition 8 (Private Funding with Repo) The bank’s ﬁnancing policy is characterized
as follows:
(i) There exists a cutoﬀ λ1 ∈ [0, 1) such that, if λ ≥ λ1, the bank’s ﬁnancing policy (s∗, d∗)
has the bank borrowing either by issuing only unsecured debt (s∗ = 0) or by issuing the
maximum possible amount of secured debt (s∗ = pk). When s = 0, the bank oﬀers no
rollover premium, and the unsecured lenders’ participation constraint is binding.
(ii) There exists a cutoﬀ λ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that, if λ > λ2, unsecured lenders’ participation
constraint binds, i.e., VU (s
∗, d∗)− γ = 0.
(iii) There exists a cutoﬀ λ3 ∈ [0, 1) such that, if λ > max {λ1, λ2, λ3}, the bank borrows by
issuing the maximum possible amount of secured debt (s∗ = pk), and oﬀers no rollover
premium to unsecured lenders.
Intuitively, a lower chance of illiquidity induces the bank to favor lower funding costs over
the risk of runs. Similarly, it induces a lower rollover premium.
5 Deposit Insurance
In this section, we extend our model to include the possibility that a third party, such as a
regulator, provides deposit insurance (DI) to unsecuder lenders. Consistent with real practice,
we model DI as a minimum payment of π ∈ [0, 1] for unsecured lenders in all states.
In the presence of DI, the payoﬀ of unsecured lenders who do not roll over in t = 1 is
πNU (φ, θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩1, if u (1− φ) ≤ q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)1−φ∗
1−φ +
(
1− 1−φ∗
1−φ
)
max
{

φ∗u , π
}
, if u (1− φ) > q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)
,
while that of those who roll over is
πRU (φ, θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩qd+ (1− q)max {ρ, π} , if u (1− φ) ≤ q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)max{ 
φ∗u , π
}
, if u (1− φ) > q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)
. (19)
Therefore, unsecured lender’s net payoﬀ of rolling over relative to that of running is
ΠRU (φ, θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩qd+ (1− q)max {ρ, π} − 1, if u (1− φ) ≤ q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)− pk−s
(1−φ)(1−s)
(
1−max
{

φ∗u , π
})
, if u (1− φ) > q (θ − c) + p (k − sh)
. (20)
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Similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1984), if the regulator provides full insurance, π = 1, then
it is a dominant strategy to roll over regardless of the uncertain liquidation value of the assets
θ and the fraction of unsecured lenders that roll over φ. That is, full insurance fully deters
runs and achieves eﬃciency. If the amount of DI is such that π ≤ min
{

1−pk , ρ
}
, the payoﬀs
are the same as those without the presence of DI and all the previous results go through.
We are thus left with the following two cases: min
{

1−pk , ρ
}
< π ≤ max
{

1−pk , ρ
}
and
max
{

1−pk , ρ
}
< π < 1. As before, the equilibrium cutoﬀ θ∗DI can then be computed by the
threshold type who must be indiﬀerent between rolling over and withdrawing given his beliefs
about φ:
∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ
∗
DI) = 0.
This leads us to Proposition 9:
Proposition 9 (Run Cutoﬀ with DI) Suppose min
{

1−pk , ρ
}
< π < 1. In the limit σ →
0, the unique equilibrium in t = 1 has unsecured lenders following monotone strategies with
threshold θ∗ given by
θ∗DI = (1− s) e
−W
(
d−1
pk−s
1−s (1−max{ 1−pk ,π})
)
+ c− (pk − s) , (21)
where all unsecured lenders roll over if θ > θ∗ and do not roll over if θ < θ∗.
The results in Corollary 3 below follow from Proposition 9.
Corollary 4 (DI Eﬀect on Stability) If π = 1, then there is no run in the presence of DI.
If π ≤ min
{

1−pk , ρ
}
, the probability of bankruptcy with DI and without DI are the same:
θ∗DI = θ
∗. If min
{

1−pk , ρ
}
< π < 1, the probability of bankruptcy with DI is at least as low
as that without DI: θ∗DI = θ
∗ for π ≤ 
1−pk and θ
∗
DI < θ
∗ for π > 
1−pk , in which case θ
∗
DI is
strictly decreasing in π.
The results above show that for any given private funding choice, an increase in the level
of DI from π to π′ > π reduces the probability of bankruptcy (provided that π is suﬃciently
large). The natural question that arises is whether the same result holds taking into the
dependence of the bank’s funding choice on the level of DI.
If the high state is suﬃciently likely (λ large enough), then Proposition 8 tells us that the
bank issues the maximum possible amount of secured debt, s∗ = pk, and the face value of
unsecured debt is determined by unsecured lenders’ participation constraint VU (pk, d
∗; π) = γ.
An increase in π, directly reduces the probability of bankruptcy as θ∗ (pk, d∗; π′) < θ∗ (pk, d∗; π),
which increases unsecured lenders’ expected payoﬀ VU (pk, d
∗; π′) > VU (pk, d∗; π) = γ. Thus,
the bank’s is able to reduce the face value of debt to d∗′ < d∗ such that VU (pk, d∗′; π′) =
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VU (pk, d
∗; π) = γ, which indirectly increases the probability of bankruptcy: θ∗ (pk, d∗′; π) >
θ∗ (pk, d∗; π). Corollary 4 below shows that the direct eﬀect dominates when λ is suﬃciently
large.
Corollary 5 (DI Eﬀect on Private Ineﬃciency) Suppose 
1−pk < π < 1 and λ is suﬃ-
ciently large. Then under the private funding choice with DI, both the face value of unsecured
debt d∗ and the probability of bankruptcy θ∗ (pk, d∗) are strictly decreasing in π.
The intuition behind the result in Corollary 4 is simple. If illiquidity is suﬃciently rare,
unsecured debt’s payoﬀ is highly sensitive to its face value. Therefore, a small decrease in d
oﬀsets the gains brought about by decreases in probability of bankruptcy. As a result, the
bank is unable to signiﬁcantly reduce the face value of unsecured debt following an increase in
the level of DI.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines run incentives under both asset liquidity and fundamental risk. We
obtain an unique run equilibrium thanks to a precise characterization of the bank default
process. While existing models assume that withdrawals are satisﬁed by asset sales, in reality
less liquid assets cannot be sold immediately without huge losses. To avoid a hasty termination
of real projects, bankruptcy law forces an automatic stay once the borrower runs out of liquid
assets, so that illiquid assets are sold under orderly resolution. In this setup we are able to
show that asset liquidity risk may cause runs even as fundamental risk vanishes.
The setup enables to evaluate the eﬀect of secured ﬁnancial credit, which reduces liquid
assets available for withdrawals. Targeting such debt to risk intolerant investors reduces the
cost of funding. However, as secured credit claims the safest assets, it makes each unit of
unsecured debt more exposed to risk, requiring a higher rollover yield. This shifts the signal
threshold for asset liquidity, leading to more self protecting runs (Goldstein and Pauzner,
2005). In equilibrium, more secured debt results in more frequent unsecured runs. We show
that when illiquidity is suﬃciently rare, intermediaries maximize the use of repo funding even
if they recognize the increased risk of unsecured debt runs. The socially optimal choice would
either avoid issuing secured debt, or use its lower cost to create rolloever rents for other
creditors.
The direct risk creation eﬀect of repo debt described here complements the indirect eﬀect
from collateral ﬁre sales, which reduces collateral liquidity. We show that this forces higher
repo haircuts, which further shifts the run threhsold, reinforcing the direct risk allocation
eﬀect. While the private choice of secured funding is excessive, its lower cost may induce more
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credit for marginal projects. This may have a procyclical eﬀect on credit volume as well as on
risk incentives.
A key question for future research concerns the eﬀect of encumbered assets on stability when
disclosure is limited. This reinforces market segmentation between traditional bank funding
and its secured transactions, such as derivatives (Acharya and Bisin, 2013). Imprecise dis-
closure may create Knightian uncertainty and self fulﬁlling panics (Caballero Khrisnamurthy,
2008), even before private information on fundamental values becomes information sensitive
(Gorton and Ordon˜ez, 2014).
Finally, the introduction of a more accurate bank default process implied that run incentives
depend in part on the liquidity of bank assets. In future work we plan more attention to the
role of mandatory cash reserves.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) and Morris and Shin (2003) prove
this result for a general class of global games, including those where θ is drawn from a uniform
distribution on
[
θ, θ
]
, the noise terms ηi are i.i.d. accross players and drawn from a uniform
distribution on
[−1
2
, 1
2
]
, and that satisfy the following additional conditions: (i) for each θ, there
exists φ∗ ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞} such that ΠRU (φ, θ) > 0 if φ > φ∗ and ΠRU (φ, θ) < 0 if φ < φ∗; (ii)
ΠRU (φ, θ) is nondecreasing in θ; (iii) there exists a unique θ
∗ that satisﬁes
∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ
∗) dφ = 0;
(iv) there exists D and D with σ < min
{
θ −D,D − θ}, and  > 0 such that ΠRU (φ, θ) ≤ −
for all φ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ≤ D and ΠRU (φ, θ) >  for all φ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ≥ D; and (v) continuity of∫ 1
0
w (φ) ΠRU (φ, θ) dφ with respect to signal θ and density w. Except for (iii), Π
R
U (φ, θ) clearly
satisﬁes (i), (ii), (iv) and (v).
We now show that (iii) is also satisﬁed. Let Δ (θ; d) ≡ ∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ) dφ. Since Δ (θ; d) < 0
for all d and θ < c, then if θ∗ exists it must be that θ∗ ≥ c. Moreover, since Δ (θ; d) is strictly
increasing in θ for θ ≥ c, we must show that Δ (c; d) ≤ 0 for all d (otherwise for some d
we have Δ (θ; d) ≥ Δ(c; d) > 0 for all θ ≥ c and no θ∗ would satisfy Δ (θ∗; d) = 0 ). We
also have that (a) Δ (c; d) is strictly increasing in d, (b) d is bounded by r (in which case
the bank’s participation constraint binds), and (c) Δ (c; r) = k
(
1− 
1−k
)
ln k
e
− r−1
1− 
1−k
≤ (<) 0 if
e
− r−1
1− 
1−k ≥ (>) k. Therefore, for r−1
1−−k ≤ 1 we have
e
− r−1
1− 
1−k > 1− r − 1
1− 
1−k
= (1− pk)
(
1− r − 1
1− 	− k
)
+ k ≥ k,
which implies that for all d we have Δ (c; d) ≤ Δ(c; r) < 0. In addition, for all d we have
Δ (θ; d) > 0 for θ suﬃciently large such that there exists θ∗ > c that satisﬁes Δ (θ∗; d) = 0.
Finally, there is a unique such θ∗ as Δ (θ; d) is strictly increasing in θ for θ ≥ c.
For the derivation of the cutoﬀ θ∗, note that condition
∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ
∗) dφ = 0 is equivalent to
k
(
1− 	
1− k
)
ln (θ∗ − c+ k) + (θ∗ − c+ k) (d− 1) = 0. (A.1)
After some algebra, (A.9) can be rewritten as
d− 1
k
(
1− 
1−k
) = − ln (θ∗ − c+ k) e− ln(θ∗−c+k). (A.2)
Let W (·) be the inverse function of y = xex for x ≥ −1 (known as the Lambert W function),
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that is, x = W (y). Combined with (A.10) this implies
θ∗ = e
−W
(
d−1
k(1− 1−k)
)
+ c− k,
which establishes the result.
Proof of Corollary 1. Implicitly diﬀerentiating y = W (y) eW (y) results in
W ′ =
W
(W + 1) y
=
e−W
1 +W
> 0,
W ′′ = W ′2
(−2−W
1 +W
)
< 0.
This allows us to compute
∂θ∗
∂d
=
−e−WW ′
k
(
1− 
1−k
) < 0,
∂2θ∗
∂d2
=
e−W (W ′2 −W ′′)[
k
(
1− 
1−k
)]2 > 0,
∂θ∗
∂k
= −1 + W
2
(d− 1) (W + 1)
[
1− 	
(1− k)2
]
.
If (1− k)2 ≤ 	, then ∂θ∗
∂k
< 0 and W is increasing in k, which implies ∂
2θ∗
∂k2
< 0. If
(1− k)2 > 	, then ∂θ∗
∂k
is positive for k close enough to 0 and W is decreasing in k, which
implies that ∂
2θ∗
∂k2
< 0. Therefore, there exists k∗ ∈
(
0, 1−√	
)
such that ∂θ
∗
∂k
= 0, with ∂θ
∗
∂k
> 0
for k < k∗ and ∂θ
∗
∂k
< 0 for k > k∗.
Proof of Corollary 2. This result is shown in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that the bank’s participation constraint must bind at
a solution do, in which case do = r. Suppose not, that is, VB (d
o) > 0 . The aggregate payoﬀ
r −DW (d) is clearly increasing in d. The bank’s payoﬀ is strictly concave in d as
θ
∂V 2B (d)
∂d2
= 2 (1− λ) ∂θ
∗
∂d
− (1− λ) (r − d) ∂
2θ∗
∂d2
< 0,
which in turn implies VB (d) is either (1) decreasing or (2) increasing and then decreasing since
θ
∂VB (d)
∂d
= − [θ − (1− λ) θ∗]− (1− λ) (r − d) ∂θ∗
∂d
− (θ − 1)
is negative for d = r. If ∂VB(d)
∂d
≤ 0 for all d, then VB (d) is monotone decreasing. If ∂VB(d)∂d > 0
for some d′, then there exists d′′ such that ∂VB(d)
∂d
= 0. Since VB (d) is strictly concave in
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d, ∂VB(d)
∂d
> 0 for d < d′′ and ∂VB(s,d)
∂d
< 0 for d > d′′. Moreover, the bank’s participation
constraint binds when d = r. Therefore, the social planner can increase do until VB (d
o) binds:
this increases the aggregate payoﬀ while still satifying the constraints, which contradicts do
being a solution.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that θo (do) ≥ θ∗ (d∗). Since we assume the project
has positive NPV=, the bank’s payoﬀ under (18) is greater than zero. But then a contrat
with d marginally greater than d∗ satiﬁes both participation constraints in (17) and results in
θo (do) ≥ θ∗ (d∗) > θ∗ (d). But this contradicts do being a solution to (17).
Proof of Proposition 4. The ﬁrst order necessary conditions (FOC) are
−∂DW (d)
∂d
=
∂VU (d)
∂d
(1− μ) , (A.3)
μ [VU (d)− γ] = 0, (A.4)
VU (d) ≥ γ, (A.5)
μ ≥ 0. (A.6)
Since VB (d) is strictly concave (see Proof of Proposition 2), any d satisfying the FOC is a
global maximizer, which shows (i).
For (ii), note that
∂DW (d)
∂d
=
(1− λ)
θ
∂θ∗ (d)
∂d
(r − pk − 	) , (A.7)
∂VU (d)
∂d
= 1− (1− λ)
θ
[
θ∗ (d) +
∂θ∗ (d)
∂d
(d− pk − 	)
]
. (A.8)
Consider μ = 0. As λ gets close to 1, the left- and right-hand sides of (A.14) approach 0
((A.18) approximates 0) and 1 ((A.19) converges to 1), respectively. Therefore, there are only
two possibilities: either the left-hand side of (A.14) (strictly decreasing in λ) is smaller than
the right-hand side (strictly increasing in λ) for all λ ≥ λ1 = 0, or there exists λ (d) ∈ (0, 1)
such that the left-hand side of (A.14) is smaller than the right-hand side if λ > λ (d) and at
least as great if otherwise. If the former is true for all d, then (A.14) can only be satiﬁed if
μ > 0. Suppose there exists d such that the latter is true and denote Y the set of all such d.
If λ > λ1 = sup {λ (d) : d ∈ Y }, then (A.14) can only be satiﬁed if μ > 0. Combining these
two possibilities we deduct that there exists a cutoﬀ λ1 ∈ [0, 1) such μ > 0 if λ > λ1, which in
turn implies that VU (d)− γ = 0 (from (A.15)).
Proof of Proposition 5. As in the proof of Proposition 1, it suﬃces to show that (iii)
is also satisﬁed. Let Δ (θ; s, d) ≡ ∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ) dφ. Since Δ (θ; s, d) < 0 for all (s, d) and θ < c,
then if θ∗ exists it must be that θ∗ ≥ c. Moreover, since Δ (θ; s, d) is strictly increasing in θ
for θ ≥ c, we must show that Δ (c; s, d) ≤ 0 for all (s, d) (otherwise for some (s, d) we have
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Δ(θ; s, d) ≥ Δ(c; s, d) > 0 for all θ ≥ c and no θ∗ would satisfy Δ (θ∗; s, d) = 0 ). It is
straightforward to show that (a) Δ (c; s, d) is strictly increasing in d, (b) d is bounded by r−s
1−s
(in which case the bank’s participation constraint binds), (c) Δ
(
c; s, r−s
1−s
)
is decreasing in s if
r−1
1−−pk ≤ 1pk , and (d) that Δ (c; 0, r) = pk
(
1− 
1−pk
)
ln pk
e
− r−1
1− 
1−pk
≤ (<) 0 if e
− r−1
1− 
1−pk ≥ (>) pk.
Therefore, for r−1
1−−pk ≤ 1 we have
e
− r−1
1− 
1−pk > 1− r − 1
1− 
1−pk
= (1− pk)
(
1− r − 1
1− 	− pk
)
+ pk ≥ pk,
which implies that for all (s, d) we have Δ (c; s, d) ≤ Δ (c; s, r−s
1−s
) ≤ Δ(c; 0, r) < 0. In addition,
for all (s, d) we have Δ (θ; s, d) > 0 for θ suﬃciently large such that there exists θ∗ ≥ c that
satisﬁes Δ (θ∗; s, d) = 0. Finally, there is a unique such θ∗ as Δ (θ; s, d) is strictly increasing in
θ for θ ≥ c.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, the cutoﬀ θ∗ can be derived by solving
∫ 1
0
ΠRU (φ, θ
∗) dφ = 0,
which is equivalent to:
pk − s
1− s
(
1− 	
1− pk
)
ln
θ∗ − c+ pk − s
1− s +
θ∗ − c+ pk − s
1− s (d− 1) = 0. (A.9)
After some algebra, (A.9) can be rewritten as
d− 1
pk−s
1−s
(
1− 
1−pk
) = − ln θ∗ − c+ pk − s
1− s e
− ln θ∗−c+pk−s
1−s . (A.10)
Let W (·) be the inverse function of y = xex for x ≥ −1 (known as the Lambert W function),
that is, x = W (y). Combined with (A.10) this implies
θ∗ = (1− s) e
−W
(
d−1
pk−s
1−s (1− 1−pk)
)
+ c− (pk − s) .
Proof of Corollary 3. Diﬀerentiating θ∗ with respect to s shows (i):
∂θ∗
∂s
= e−W
[
eW − 1− 1− pk
pk − s
W
W + 1
]
, (A.11)
∂2θ∗
∂s2
= −e
−WW (−2−W )
(W + 1)3
(1− pk)2
(pk − s)2 (1− s) < 0. (A.12)
We now show (ii). Since lim
s→pk
∂θ∗(s,d)
∂s
= −∞ and θ∗ (s, d) is strictly concave in s, it follows
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that θ∗ (s, d) is strictly decreasing in s if ∂θ
∗(0,d)
∂s
≤ 0, and ﬁrst strictly increasing then decreasing
in s if ∂θ
∗(0,d)
∂s
> 0. Let us write ∂θ
∗(0,d)
∂s
= e−W (d)β (d), where β (d) is the term inside the brackets
in (A.11).
We have that β′ (d) = W ′ (d)
[
eW (d) − 1−pk
pk
1
(W (d)+1)2
]
> 0 whenever pk ≥ 1
2
. Since β (1) = 0,
it follows that β (d) > 0 ⇒ ∂θ∗(0,d)
∂s
> 0 for all d > d = 1 and pk ≥ 1
2
, which implies θ∗ (s, d) is
ﬁrst strictly increasing then decreasing.
For pk < 1
2
, we have that β′ (d) < 0 for d close enough to 1 and β′ (d) > 0 for d high
enough, which implies there exists d′ > 1 such that β′ (d′) = 0. Our next step is to show
that β (d) is strictly quasi-convex. We do so by showing that the strict single crossing func-
tions W ′ (d) eW (d) and −W ′ (d) 1−pk
pk
1
(W (d)+1)2
satisfy strict signed-ratio monotonicity, which
implies β′ (d) is a strict single crossing function (Qua and Strulovici, 2012). Two functions
f (d) and g (d) satisfy strict signed-ratio monotonicity if whenever f (d) > 0 and g (d) < 0,
− g(d)
f(d)
is strictly decreasing and whenever f (d) < 0 and g (s) > 0, −f(d)
g(d)
is strictly decreasing.
We take g (d) = −W ′ (d) 1−pk
pk
1
(W (d)+1)2
and f (d) = W ′ (d) eW (d). Since f (d) is always positive,
we only need to consider the case in which g (d) < 0. In this case, − g(d)
f(d)
=
1−pk
pk
1
(W (d)+1)2
eW (d)
is
clearly strictly decreasing since the numerator is strictly decreasing while the denominator is
strictly increasing.
Therefore, β′ (d) > 0 for d > d′ and β′ (d) < 0 for d < d′. Since β (1) = 0, it follows that
β (d) < 0 ⇒ ∂θ∗(0,d)
∂s
< 0 for 1 < d ≤ d′. Because β (d) > 0 for d suﬃciently high, there exists
d > d′ such that β (d) = 0 ⇒ ∂θ∗(0,d)
∂s
= 0. As a result, we have β (d) ≤ 0 ⇒ ∂θ∗(0,d)
∂s
≤ 0 for
d ≤ d (θ∗ (s, d) is strictly decreasing) and β (d) > 0 ⇒ ∂θ∗(0,d)
∂s
> 0 for d > d (θ∗ (s, d) is ﬁrst
strictly increasing then decreasing).
Proof of Proposition 6. We ﬁrst show that the bank’s participation constraint must bind
at a solution (so, do). Suppose not, that is, VB (s
o, do) > 0 . The aggregate payoﬀ r−DW (s, d)
is increasing in d, while the bank’s payoﬀ is either one of the following: (1) decreasing, or (2)
increasing and then decreasing. To see this, note that
θ
∂VB (s, d)
∂d
= − (1− s) [θ − (1− λ) θ∗]− (1− λ) (r − d (1− s)− s) ∂θ∗
∂d
− (θ − 1) (1− s)
is negative for d = r−s
1−s and θ
∂2VB(s,d)
∂d2
< 0. If ∂VB(s,d)
∂d
≤ 0 for all d, then VB (s, d) is monotone
decreasing. If ∂VB(s,d)
∂d
> 0 for some d′, then there exists d′′ such that ∂VB(s,d)
∂d
= 0. Since
VB (s, d) is strictly concave,
∂VB(s,d)
∂d
> 0 for d < d′′ and ∂VB(s,d)
∂d
< 0 for d > d′′. Moreover,
the bank’s participation constraint binds when d = r−s
1−s . Therefore, the social planner can
increase do until VB (s
o, do) binds: this increases the aggregate payoﬀ while still satifying the
constraints, which contradicts (so, do) being a solution.
The result that the bank’s participation constraint binds along with our assumption that
the project has positive NPV implies that the unsecured lenders’ participation constraint does
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not bind. Thus, the social social planner’s problem can be equivalently rewritten as min
s∈[0,pk]
θ∗
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
.
We now show that θ∗
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
is strictly quasi-concave in s, implying a corner solution
so ∈ {0, pk}. We do so by showing that the strict single crossing functions e−W 1−pk
pk−s
W
W+1
and
−e−W (eW − 1− W
W+1
)
satisfy strict signed-ratio monotonicity, which implies −∂θ
∗(s, r−s1−s)
∂s
=
e−W
[
1−pk
pk−s
W
W+1
− (eW − 1− W
W+1
)]
is a strict single crossing function (Qua and Strulovici,
2012). Two functions f (s) and g (s) satisfy strict signed-ratio monotonicity if whenever
f (s) > 0 and g (s) < 0, − g(s)
f(s)
is strictly decreasing and whenever f (s) < 0 and g (s) > 0,
−f(s)
g(s)
is strictly decreasing. We take g (s) = −e−W (eW − 1− W
W+1
)
and f (s) = e−W 1−pk
pk−s
W
W+1
.
Since f (s) is always positive, we only need to consider the case in which g (s) < 0. In this
case, it must be that −g(s)′f(s)−g(s)f(s)′
f(s)2
< 0. Indeed, we have
−g (s)′ f (s) + g (s) f (s)′ = (1− pk)
(pk − s)2
[
1−
(
eW − 1) (W + 2)
W (W + 1)
]
<
(1− pk)
(pk − s)2
[
1− W + 2
W + 1
]
< 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality results from the following version of Bernoulli’s inequality: ex > 1+x
for x > 0.
Finally, we determine the conditions under which each corner solution is optimal. Since
θ∗
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
is strictly quasi-concave and lim
s→pk
∂θ∗(s, r−s1−s)
∂s
= −∞ it follows that θ∗ is strictly de-
creasing in s if ∂θ
∗(0,r)
∂s
≤ 0, and ﬁrst strictly increasing then decreasing in s if ∂θ∗(0,r)
∂s
> 0,
where
∂θ∗ (0, r)
∂s
= e−W
[
eW − 1− 1
pk
W
W + 1
]
. (A.13)
Let us write ∂θ
∗(0,r)
∂s
= e−W (r)β (r), where β (r) is the term inside the brackets in (A.13).
Following the same steps in the proof of Corollart 3 (for the case when pk < 1
2
), we can show
that β (r) is strictly quasi-convex and there exists r > 1 is such that β (r) = 0, with β (r) ≤ 0
⇒ ∂θ∗(0,r)
∂s
≤ 0 for r ≤ r and β (r) > 0 ⇒ ∂θ∗(0,r)
∂s
> 0 for r > r.
Therefore, it follows that (so, do) =
(
pk, r−pk
1−pk
)
for r ≤ r. For r > r, there exists s′ such
that θ∗
(
s, r−s
1−s
)
is strictly increasing for s < s′ and strictly decreasing for s > s′. From the
proof of Proposition 1, we know that θ∗ (0, r) > c. Since lim
k→k
θ∗
(
pk, r−pk
1−pk
)
= c, there exists a
k∗ ∈
(
s′
p
, k
)
such that θ∗ (0, r) = θ∗
(
pk∗, r−pk
∗
1−pk∗
)
, with θ∗ (0, r) ≤ θ∗
(
pk, r−pk
1−pk
)
for k ≤ k∗ and
θ∗ (0, r) > θ∗
(
pk, r−pk
1−pk
)
for k > k∗.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that θo (so, do) ≥ θ∗ (s∗, d∗). Since we assume the
project has positive NPV, the bank’s payoﬀ under (18) is greater than zero (the bank can garan-
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tee a positive payoﬀ by choosing s = 0). But then a contrat (s∗, d) with d marginally greater
than d∗ satiﬁes both participation constraints in (17) and results in θo (so, do) ≥ θ∗ (s∗, d∗) >
θ∗ (s∗, d). But this contradicts (so, do) being a solution to (17).
Proof of Proposition 8. We ﬁrst show (i). We use the Principle of Iterated Suprema
to break the bank’s problem into two stages, that is, we solve max
d∈D
[
max
s∈S
VB (s, d)
]
, where
S = [0, pk] and D = {d : VU (s∗ (d) , d) ≥ γ}.
The next step is to show that VB (s, d) is quasiconvex in s if λ suﬃciently high, which
implies that there is not interior solution to problem max
s∈S
VB (s, d). This is done by showing
that ∂VB(s,d)
∂s
= VU (s, d) − 1 − (1− s) ∂VU (s,d)∂s − ∂DW (s,d)∂s is a single crossing function, which is
equivalent to VU − 1 − (1− s) ∂VU∂s and −∂DW∂s satisfying signed-ratio monotonicity (Qua and
Strulovici, 2012). Two functions f (s) and g (s) satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity if whenever
f (s) > 0 and g (s) < 0, − g(s)
f(s)
is decreasing and whenever f (s) < 0 and g (s) > 0, −f(s)
g(s)
is
decreasing. We take g (s) = −∂DW (s,d)
∂s
and f (s) = VU (s, d) − 1 − (1− s) ∂VU (s,d)∂s . Since f (s)
is always positive, we only need to consider the case in which g (s) < 0. In this case, it must
be that −g(s)′f(s)−g(s)f(s)′
f(s)2
< 0. We have
θ
[−g (s)′ f (s) + g (s) f (s)′] =
(1− λ) θ∗′′ (r − pk − 	){(d− 1) [θ − (1− λ) θ∗]+ (1− λ) θ∗′ [d (1− s)− (pk − s+ 	)]}
− (1− λ) θ∗′ (r − pk − 	) {(1− λ) θ∗′′ [d (1− s)− (pk − s+ 	)]− 2 (1− λ) θ∗′ (d− 1)}
= (1− λ) (r − pk − 	) (d− 1) [θ∗′′ (θ − (1− λ) θ∗)+ 2 (1− λ) θ∗′θ∗′] .
The sign of the above expression is determined by the term inside brackets, which is strictly
decreasing in λ. For any given s, it is negative if λ is suﬃciently close to 1, so that we are left
with two possibilities: either it is nonpositive for all λ, or there exists λ (s) ∈ (0, 1) such that it
is nonpositive if λ ≥ λ (s) and positive if otherwise. If the former is true for all s, then VB (s, d)
is quasiconvex if λ ≥ λ1 = 0. Suppose there exists s such that the latter is true and denote X
the set of all such s. Then VB (s, d) is quasiconvex if λ ≥ λ1 = sup {λ (s) : s ∈ X}. Combining
both cases we have that there exists a cutﬀ λ1 ∈ [0, 1) such that VB (s, d) is quasiconvex if
λ ≥ λ1, which in turn implies that we must have a corner solution: s∗ ∈ {0, pk}.
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We now turn to the problem max
d∈D
VB (s
∗, d). The ﬁrst order necessary conditions (FOC) are
−∂DW (s
∗, d)
∂d
=
∂VU (s
∗, d)
∂d
[1− s∗ − μ] , (A.14)
μ [VU (s
∗, d)− γ] = 0, (A.15)
VU (s
∗, d) ≥ γ, (A.16)
μ ≥ 0. (A.17)
To conclude the proof of (i) we need to show that any d satisfying the FOC is a global
maximizer. This follows from
θ
∂V 2B (s, d)
∂d2
= 2 (1− s) (1− λ) ∂θ
∗
∂d
− (1− λ) (r − d (1− s)− s) ∂
2θ∗
∂d2
< 0,
which implies that VB (s
∗, d) is (strictly) concave in d.
We now show (ii). Note that
∂DW (s∗, d)
∂d
=
(1− λ)
θ
∂θ∗ (s∗, d)
∂d
(r − pk − 	) , (A.18)
∂VU (s
∗, d)
∂d
= 1− (1− λ)
θ
[
θ∗ (s∗, d) +
∂θ∗ (s∗, d)
∂d
(
d− pk − s
∗ + 	
1− s∗
)]
. (A.19)
Consider μ = 0. As λ gets close to 1, the left- and right-hand sides of (A.14) approach 0
((A.18) approximates 0) and 1 − s∗ ((A.19) converges to 1), respectively. Since s is bounded
above by pk < 1, the right-hand side of (A.14) is bounded away from 0. Therefore, there are
only two possibilities: either the left-hand side of (A.14) (strictly decreasing in λ) is smaller
than the right-hand side (strictly increasing in λ) for all λ, or there exists λ (s∗, d) ∈ (0, 1)
such that the left-hand side of (A.14) is smaller than the right-hand side if λ > λ (s∗, d) and
at least as great if otherwise. If the former is true for all d, then (A.14) can only be satiﬁed if
μ > 0. Suppose there exists d such that the latter is true and denote Y the set of all such d.
If λ > λ2 = sup {λ (s∗, d) : d ∈ Y }, then (A.14) can only be satiﬁed if μ > 0. Combining these
two possibilities we deduct that there exists a cutoﬀ λ2 ∈ (0, 1) such μ > 0 if λ > λ2, which in
turn implies that VU (s
∗, d)− γ = 0 (from (A.15)).
We ﬁnally show (iii). Suppose λ > max {λ1, λ2}. In this case we know from (i) that there
are two possible candidates for the bank’s choice of secured debt: either s∗ = pk or s∗ = 0.
We also know that unsecured lenders’ participation constraint binds. Therefore, the bank’s
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implied payoﬀs are given by
VB (pk, d
∗ (pk)) = r − pk − (1− pk) γ −DW (pk, d∗ (pk)) , (A.20)
VB (0, d
∗ (0)) = r − γ −DW (0, d∗ (0)) . (A.21)
The diﬀerence is given by
VB (pk, d
∗ (pk))− VB (0, d∗ (0)) = pk (γ − 1)− [DW (pk, d∗ (pk))−DW (0, d∗ (0))] , (A.22)
which is positive for λ suﬃciently close to 1. Thus, there are two cases to consider: either
(A.22) (strictly increasing in λ) is nonnegative for all λ ≥ λ3 = 0, or there exists λ3 ∈ (0, 1)
such that (A.22) is nonnegative if λ > λ3, and negative if λ < λ3. Therefore, we conclude that
if λ > max {λ1, λ2, λ3}, then the bank’s ﬁnancing policy has the bank borrowing by issuing
only secured debt (s∗ = pk) and d∗ is such that VU (s∗, d)− γ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 9. Proof is analogous to those of Propositions 1 and 5.
Proof of Corollary 4. See discussion in text.
Proof of Corollary 5. For λ large enough, unsecured lenders’ participation constraint
binds: VU (pk, d
∗; π) = γ. Thus, the overall change in θ∗ caused by an increase in π can be
found by diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to π, whihc yields:
∂θ∗ (d, π)
∂d
d′ +
∂θ∗ (d, π)
∂π
=
(1−λ)θ∗(d,π)
θ
[
d′ − 1−pk
1−pk
]
− d′
(1−λ)
θ
[
− (d− 1)− 1−pk
1−pk (1− π)
] .
Since the denumerator on the right-hand side is negative and d′ < 0, the overall expression is
negative for λ large enough.
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